East Asia’s Strategic and Economic Future: American Perspectives and Chinese Responses
The Honorable Kevin Michael Rudd
26th Prime Minister of Australia
It's good to be back in China.
It's good to be back in Shanghai where nearly thirty years ago I once served as Acting Australian Consul-General in the days when there were only a handful of countries with consular missions in China's commercial capital.
It is good to be back at Fudan University, a celebrated member of China's Ivy League, where I sent my own son Nicholas to study Chinese just a decade ago.
很高兴能够再次造访复旦大学 ——这所著名的 “中国常春藤盟校 ”（九校联盟之一）。十年前，我的儿子尼古拉斯就在此学习中文。
All these years later, I am now affiliated with the American Ivy League having taken up a position as Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School.
My policy research project at the Belfer Center is "Alternative Futures for US China Relations -2014 to 2023."
我在哈佛肯尼迪政府学院贝尔福中心的政策研究项目题为 “未来十年中美关系的可能未来 ”。
I undertook this project because of President Xi Jinping's advocacy of the concept of "A New Type of Great Power Relationship" as a means of avoiding long-term conflict between an emerging great power and an established great power.
我研究此项目缘起习近平主席所提 “新型大国关系 ”之概念，意指如何避免守成大国与新兴大国之间的长期矛盾。
I wanted to explore what such a concept could mean for the future of the US-China relationship, given that this relationship will shape much of the future of the Asian hemisphere we all share.
有鉴于中美关系对于我们亚太地区的共同未来有决定性的影响，深入了解 “新型大国关系 ”的概念对于中美关系的未来意味着什么则显得至关重要。
I have also become increasingly concerned at the increasingly negative trajectory of the relationship over much of the last twelve months.
Which is why I have decided to dedicate much of my time this year to analyzing China's and America's national capabilities and intentions for the decade ahead.
And to think about whether there is sufficient commonality of Chinese and American values and interests to craft a common narrative for a shared future.
Or whether such commonality simply does not exist.
In which case both the relationship's and the region's future is more likely to be shaped by events and by reactions to those events.
And in an environment increasingly charged with strategic competition, crisis and possible conflict.
Within this framework, last week in Washington I delivered an address launching the Zbignew Bryzinski Institute at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
I entitled the address “East Asia's Strategic and Economic Future: Chinese Perspectives and American Responses".
演讲题为 “东亚的战略与经济未来：中国视角和美国应对 ”。
Its purpose was to describe to the best extent I was able the world and the region as seen through Chinese eyes.
Of course I cannot pretend to be objective on these matters.
I am not Chinese.
I am a westerner, although one who has dedicated a large part of his life to the study of China.
And the country of which I was until recently Prime Minister remains of course a long-standing ally of the United States.
Nonetheless I believe it is important for our friends in Washington to understand something of the reality that is seen through the prism of the perceptions and priorities of the Chinese leadership， rather than simply taking as a given a world seen only though American eyes.
Today in Shanghai, I propose to do the reverse.
To describe China as currently seen from America.
And to do so as frankly as possible.
Once again I am obviously not an American.
I therefore speak with no authority.
I simply seek to describe my observations of the deep views of the US foreign policy elite, without necessarily seeking to defend them.
And I do all this with a view to helping provide something of a third-party reality check on how each side actually views the aspirations and the policies of the other.
Because I also believe it is impossible to craft any common narrative for the future unless it is firmly based on the realpolitik of current perceptions of one another.
And perceptions, of course, ultimately shape policy.
China, among other states, invariably bridles against the repeated assertion of the universality of American values, an assertion that runs fundamentally against the Chinese belief that each country has its own values.
And it is a matter of political sovereignty for that country to choose whatever political system best reflects those values, irrespective of whether they happen to conform with one's own.
This view is reflected in the most basic doctrinal statements of Chinese foreign policy, the most important of which is the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence."
这个观点也反映在了中国最基本的外交政策方针，即 “和平共处五项原则 ”上。
These include principles of "mutual respect" and "noninterference in the domestic affairs of another country."
其中包括 “互相尊重 ”，以及 “互不干涉内政 ”。
It is therefore impossible to understand American attitudes to China, the region and the world without understanding the long-standing centrality of liberal democratic values of opportunity, freedom and democracy to the American political tradition.
Critically, these values have been seen from the beginning of the American republic as not just American values, but values for all of humankind.
They were grounded in the sentiments of 150 years of settlement from the early seventeenth century.
这些价值扎根于自 17世纪初开始的长达 150年的殖民地时期的情操之中。
Generations of dissenters travelled to America in pursuit of political and religious freedoms they did not enjoy in a Europe wracked by the wars of religion and the princely autocracies that fought them.
These freedoms were finally and formally secured by the definitive political act that was the American revolution.
They have constituted the central narrative of American politics and the American nation in the 240 years since.
They have also become the animating force of the American identity.
In the American tradition, these freedoms are seen as the "city on the hill."
在美国传统中，这些自由被视作是 “岭上之都 ”的神谕。
They constitute what the Americans see as the moral basis of what would later be called "American exceptionalism."
这些自由也构成了被美国人民视为 “美国例外主义 ”的道德基准。
For the nineteenth century this would, in the American perception, become the magnetic force that would attract tens of millions of migrants from the Old World to this "city on the hill" in the new.
在美国的理解看来， 19世纪，对 “岭上之都 ”的向往像一块磁铁一样吸引了数以千万计的移民离开了旧世界的故乡，踏上了前往新世界的旅程。
These freedoms also became a galvanizing force in the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery.
In other words, democratic freedoms were for America itself, not for political or military export to the rest of the world, other than as the exemplar state.
It was not until the twentieth century that a reluctant America would be drawn into foreign entanglements and European wars, but not so much as the defence of a political ideal but rather the defence of its national interests in its freedom of navigation.
Woodrow Wilson's attempts to entrench American ideals in a liberal internationalist order for the world in a League of Nations were shunned by an isolationist American congress.
And then a generation later, again a reluctant America finally committed to another global war, again because its interests were attacked in the Pacific while Hitler declared war from across the Atlantic.
It was only during the course of the Second World War that the defence of American values were finally elevated to a global cause in the American mind in a global war against German and Japanese fascism.
The American people bought war bonds to finance the American war effort in defence of Roosevelt's "four freedoms:" freedom of speech," freedom of worship," freedom from want" and "freedom from fear."
美国人民在罗斯福的号召下，在二战期间购买军事公债应援战事，为捍卫 “四个自由 ”，即 “言论自由 ”， “宗教信仰自由 ”， “不虞匮乏的自由 ”，以及 “免除恐惧的自由 ”。
The United States, emerging from a deep tradition of isolationism that had by and large dominated American politics since the Revolution then sought to construct a post-war order which incorporated these values.
And through a combination of the United Nations, international law and American power, saw its mission as the global articulation and defence of these liberal democratic values as central to its core mission.
This mission became immediately animated by the challenge of Soviet communism and American conclusions about the rise of communist China.
With the Sino-Soviet split, the abandonment of a global ideological mission on the part of the Communist Party of China, and a decade later the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in America prematurely concluded "the end of history" and the final triumph of a liberal democratic capitalist model.
随着中苏交恶，中共放弃意识形态输出，以及十年后的苏联解体，许多美国人过早地做出了 “历史终结 ”的结论，并认为这是自由民主资本主义最终胜利。
In fact it was not the end of history.
Militant Islamism had a different view of history.
The return of Russian nationalism as a counter-force to European liberalism represents a different response again.
As does China's advocacy of its own "China Model" or the "Beijing Consensus."
“中国模式 ”或者 “北京共识 ”也有着同样的意义。
Nonetheless America's sense of its own liberal democratic exceptionalism continues as a strong, unifying narrative of America's role in the world today.
America's critics will legitimately point to the copious examples of American hypocrisy from the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East where democratically elected governments were often removed by force if they were seen as incompatible with American interests.
美国的批评者有理有据地指出，从门罗主义到中东局势不难看出美国的伪善 ——往往是一旦局势与美国国家利益相悖，民选政府依然可被以非民主的方式强行更替 ——诸如此类的例证与美国价值无疑是相悖的。
Just as it is equally legitimate to argue that for much of its 150 year history as a global superpower, the US has been the most benign superpower in history, compared with every other superpower or great power since the Persian Empire 2500 years ago.
By and large, with the exception of Teddy Roosevelt's taste for adventurism, America never sought a colonial empire, despite its undisputed power to have obtained one.
In fact, against this measure, the only comparable great power in history to the United States was China, which also, at varying times in its long history, also had the capacity to establish a vast overseas colonial empire, but chose not to.
Of course both have been involved in extensive border wars in their history.
But neither sought to subjugate distant foreign lands for the purposes of national self-aggrandizement or economic exploitation.
This commonality in the American and Chinese experience is little discussed.
It should be.
But we cannot ignore the core difference that the United States today, by reason of its historical circumstances since European settlement, continues to exhibit not just a set of liberal democratic ideals for itself, but also for the world at large.
Although the vigor with which these ideals may be prosecuted abroad will always vary, depending on the continuing tussle between the contending forces of isolationism and retrenchment on the one hand, and the moral purpose and responsibilities of global leadership on the other.
The core point concerning this exceptionalist, liberal democratic tradition of American domestic politics and foreign policy cannot simply be written away through some form of polite diplomatic agreement, irrespective of how much this may be deemed by others to be desirable.
It is an elemental part of the American identity.
To seek to do so would be the equivalent of trying to purge Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism from modern Chinese political consciousness or national identity.
In both cases it is indelible.
Yet the core difference remains that Confucianism is not designed as a value for export to the world.
Whereas American liberal democracy, either by way of active evangelization, or simply by passive example, is precisely that.
The truth, therefore, is that any common narrative between a rising China and a still powerful United States, will need to intelligently negotiate these complex ideational shoals, grounded in turn in deep questions of identity.
It is a recurring, deep problem in the relationship. And it can't simply be wished away.
American Experience of China
If then these are American values, what then of American historical experiences of China that have shaped current American perceptions?
The US was signatory to the infamous unequal treaties with the China of the late Qing.
The US was also party to the Eight Power Alliance which marched on Beijing in 1900 following the Boxer Rising.
Although the US did not insist on the full payment of reparations by the Qing government under the so-called Boxer Protocol.然而，美国没有依据所谓的《辛丑条约》向清政府要求全额赔偿。
Instead it contributed funds to the building of Tsinghua University, Yanjing University and the Peking Union Medical College, which has caused Chinese elites over the last century to view the Americans as imperialists of a different hue.
China also became in the American mind of the late 19th and early 20th centuries a rich field of Christian mission as American and European missionaries dedicated themselves to the "saving of millions of Chinese souls."
中国在 19世纪末和 20世纪初的美国人眼中亦被视作是基督教传教的沃土。彼时来自美国和欧洲的传教士纷纷投身于 “救赎千百万中国人的灵魂 ”的事业中。
As the Japanese invasion of China unfolded during the 1930s, the US increasingly identified with Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government in Nanking.
Chiang's later much publicized conversion to Christianity also helped consolidate American public support for the Nationalist cause.
Once the United States declared war on Japan in 1941, the US maintained air supplies to Chiang's wartime capital in Chongqing across "the Hump."
自 1941年对日宣战起，美国便持续通过 “驼峰航线 ”为战时陪都重庆输送物资。
Chiang through his attendance at the Cairo Conference in 1943 also came to be seen both by the Americans and the British as a core part of the global alliance against fascism.
During the second civil war between 1945 and 49, the US provided significant material support for the KMT against what was then a numerically vastly inferior Red Army force.
Although a small number of American volunteers sided with the Communist forces under Mao, the US unequivocally backed Chiang through until his flight to Taiwan in 1949.
For the next thirty years, the debate raged across the US foreign policy establishment as to who had "lost China."
此后三十年间，有关谁 “失去了中国 ”的争论在美国外交政策讨论中持续不断。
US and Chinese forces engaged each other directly in the Korean War, and in the following decades indirectly in Vietnam.
In the meantime the US dug in with the defence of Taiwan at all costs, right through until Nixon's opening to Communist China in 1972, although the Taiwan factor remains alive to this day.
From Soviet ally and ideological foe, the US view of China changed radically to de facto strategic partner in common cause against the Soviet Union in the final decades of the Cold War.
After 1989, US concerns about human rights in Communist China rose to the fore, as the Soviet threat receded and then collapsed.
From America's perspective, China during the 1990's slowly emerged from being seen as a human rights problem to being seen as a major economic opportunity.
America's support for China's prosecution of a policy of domestic economic reform and opening to the outside world during this period, culminating in US support for China's accession to the WTO in 2001, sustaining this pattern of engagement with China which placed economic cooperation at the center of the relationship.
During the last decade, the rapidly escalating growth and size of the Chinese economy began to place new strains on the relationship in critical areas of intellectual property protection, anti-dumping and accusations of currency manipulation.
In other words, the economic dynamic of the relationship, while mutually beneficial, was also beginning to generate its own tensions.
At the same time, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a strategic threat to China, followed by China's gradual normalization of its relationship with post-Soviet Russia, underlined the absence of any new compelling strategic rationale to underpin the US-China relationship capable of replacing the anti-Soviet logic of 1972.
In America's experience, since the global financial crisis, China has further evolved.
From being seen as a responsible economic partner in the critical days of the deliberations of the G20 to avoid global financial and economic collapse.
To being seen increasingly as a global economic competitor as China's economy begins to replace the US as the largest economy in the world.
As well as a country which begins now to challenge the established patterns of the post-45 security order in Asia, in addition to broader global institutional norms (most recently reflected in the current debate on the international status of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.)
China, therefore, in America's experience over the last 150 years, has evolved from being seen as a field of missionary endeavor, to a country which America lost to Communism, to one which they joined in common cause against the Soviet Union, to one which in turn is now seen to be challenging American uni-polar supremacy across a range of fronts, while all along representing a set of ideational norms in large part at variance with the universal claims of American liberal democratic values.
So what of current US perceptions of China?
Again I emphasize I do not speak for anybody in America.
Just as my speech last week in Washington did not seek in any way to reflect official Chinese views.
These are simply my observations where I seek to describe the zeitgeist of the foreign policy community in both countries.
And while I am professionally trained as a diplomat, I sometimes fear that insufficient strategic candor in both directions (ie between Washington and Beijing) in the past may inhibit the ability to craft a common strategic narrative for the future.
Assuming of course that such a narrative is possible for the future given the complexities of a shared historical experience, conflicting national historiographies, different philosophical traditions, the significant gap that currently exists between the two countries values and interests, and what I fear to be a widening gap in perceptions of each other's longer-term intentionalities.
At the core of US perceptions is a deep admiration for what China has achieved over the last 35 years.
US elite opinion was by and large skeptical that China could pull off the economic transformation you have since Deng Xiaoping changed the nation's strategic course.
The fact that the market is now anchored as a core principle of Chinese economic policy for a country under Communist Party control has staggered most Americans for its sheer audacity.
The fact that hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty commands great respect.
But there is also an American view that China does not appreciate the fact that the US has welcomed, rather than blocked, China's full participation in the international community and the institutional arrangements of the global economy.
The US for ideological reasons could have vetoed the PRC occupying the China's seat on the UNSC and in the wider UN system.
It did not.
Despite the fact that at the time China only a few years before had been at the ideological zenith of the Cultural Revolution.
The US could have blocked Chinese accession to the WTO.
It did not.
Although many criticized China's market economy status at the time.
In fact, rather than blocking Chinese WTO accession, in American eyes they did all they could to advance it, despite the difficulties of the decade in which it was negotiated.
And it is an empirical fact that Chinese net exports and rapid increases in foreign direct investment have been major drivers of China's rapid economic growth.
The US could also have avoided creating the G20 Summit, including China at the top table of global economic governance.
It did not.
It welcomed China.
Just as all G20 members have welcomed China's constructive contribution to this process both during and following the global crisis.
US foreign policy elites feel that they have done everything possible to welcome China into every domain of the global order and its governance.
Of course my Chinese friends respond by saying that the US in doing all the above has only been doing so for its own national interests, rather than acting altruistically for China.
Having observed some of these US decision-making processes over time, and the internally contested nature of them, I am not sure these US decisions were clinically one or the other.
Nonetheless whatever the motivation, the fact remains that these decisions were taken, decisions which over time have benefitted China, and when other decisions could have been taken.
Chinese friends then argue that a further motivation behind US policy was, and is, to use Chinese global engagement as a means of turning China into a full participant, supporter and contributor to a global order designed by the US and the West, for the benefit of the US and the West, and at a time when the PRC was not involved in any way in its formation.
Or as others have observed, gratuitously offering China the opportunity to become an honorary member of the West, as with Japan several decades before.
这意在吸纳中国成为西方社会的 “荣誉会员 ”——正如西方在正如几十年前如此对待日本。
Of course, my good friend and Harvard Kennedy School colleague Bob Zoellick encapsulated this thesis in his "global stakeholder theory" of 2005.
我的好友，也是在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的同事，罗伯特.佐利克，曾在 2005年将此论题归纳概括为其著名的 “全球利益相关者理论 ”。
While many Chinese found this to be condescending, in part because of the difficulties of translation of the concept of "stakeholder," and in part for the reasons given above, it should be borne in mind that Zoellick was also directing his remarks at a skeptical American public back in 2005 when many Americans were beginning to react badly to the loss of American jobs through what was perceived to be unfair Chinese competition and currency manipulation.
由于 “利益相关者 ”这个概念的晦涩翻译以及上述的原因，很多中国认为这个理论有居高临下之意。但应该注意的是，在 2005年佐利克提出该理论的时候，正值诸多美国人认为他们失业的主因在于中国的不当竞争和操纵汇率 ——佐利克此理论的受众是对此表示怀疑和过激反应的美国公众。
In significant part, what Zoellick was doing was defending a US policy of consistent support for Chinese global economic engagement. As well as articulating a positive framework for China's greater participation in the global order.
Other Chinese friends argue that the real hidden agenda behind US policy in support of absorbing China into the current liberal internationalist, rules-based order is also to subvert Chinese values with western values over time.
This in turn takes us back to my earlier arguments concerning the values divide between the two countries and the two systems, and the need for this divergence to be addressed in any common narrative for the future.
Americans would argue that China has successfully resisted foreign attempts to "subvert" its domestic philosophical traditions for over two thousand years.
对此，美方会主张，中国有成功抵御任何外来势力 “颠覆 ”其存在两千余年的哲学传统的历史经验。
Starting with Christianity which after 400 years made limited progress.
Continuing with the failure of political liberalism to take root during the Nationalist period.
And most recently with another foreign import, China's rejection of Marxism as an economic theory.
In other words, China has consistently proven itself to be sufficiently robust as a civilization to evolve its own values over time, and to chart with confidence its own national future.
More fundamentally, however, our American friends would argue that the current rules-based order has overwhelmingly suited and served China's interests over the last 35 years.
It has been the global economic framework within which Chinese prosperity has been achieved.
As for the security policy dimensions of the order, including overwhelming US military power, the Americans would argue that their strong and continuing strategic presence in Asia has preserved the peace and stability of the wider region, creating the post-75 strategic environment in which all regional economies have prospered, not least China.
The alternative, the Americans would argue, could have been a rolling series of regional conflicts, in the strategic vacuum arising for US withdrawal, including over time the radical re-armament of Japan.
This brings us to US perceptions of more recent Chinese conclusions concerning whether or not the US is pursuing a policy of containment.
The Americans argue that if China has seriously concluded that is it now the object of a policy of US containment, then this represents a fundamental miscalculation.
They argue that US policies towards China across the last 35 years have been the actual antithesis of containment.
Containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War was designed to diplomatically isolate, economically undermine and militarily confront Moscow, overtly and covertly, at every corner of the globe.
The Americans would further ask China the question that if the US is seriously containing China, then what is China currently being prevented from doing in the region and the world that it would otherwise want to do were it not for US policy?
This brings us to the related charge from my Chinese friends that the US is seeking to isolate China.
For this, Chinese commentators point to a policy of encirclement by US allies, and the strengthening of these alliances in recent years.
America would argue that every one of these alliances pre-date the rise of China by decades.
And in Australia's case by half a century.
They further argue that many of these alliances had their original rationale in providing security guarantees against the long-term re-emergence of Japan.
Then as part of a world-wide network of alliances against the Soviet Union in a period of profound ideological, political, diplomatic and military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
And following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these alliances have performed a range of functions against multiple and changing contingencies, not least contending with the rise of militant Islamism over the last decade and a half.
As for the strengthening of these alliances in recent years, the Americans may argue that this has nothing to do with the rise of China.
I personally do not think that is the case.
It is more likely to have been the case that this strengthening was in part in response to US and regional perceptions of a more assertive Chinese policy in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
Of course our Chinese friends provide a different account of both this and the East China Sea where they see their actions as responding to the efforts of others to unilaterally change the status quo.
On the broader question of alliances however, the Americans argue that none of these arrangements have been forced on regional states, nor has their recent strengthening, but rather they have been the subject of voluntary requests arising from the internal democratic deliberations of sovereign states.
Indeed the Americans point to the example of the Philippines in the 1980's when the government requested the US to leave Subic Bay and Clarke Field, which they then did.
As for the re-balance itself, and its implications here in the region, when the US says in the future it will have 60% of its global fleet here in the Pacific, compared with 50% in the past, against a shrinking US navy, that will in all probability result in the same overall naval presence, if not smaller than what we have today.
至于美国的再平衡以及再平衡概念在亚太地区的意涵，也值得思量。其实，当美国宣称未来全球美军 60%的舰队将部署在太平洋地区时，实际上美国海军部署在亚太地区的规模如果大致仅会基本维持现今的规模（因为虽然这一数字将从 50%上升至 60%，但美国海军的整体规模正在缩减。）
The US is also puzzled by other apparent Chinese conclusions that the US in engaged in an operational strategy to diminish and divide China and ultimately "sabotage" the Chinese political system from within.
美国对其他的武断的中方结论，譬如认为美国正在在筹划削弱、分裂中国，并最终从内部 “预谋破坏 ”中国政治制度的运作战略等等，同样感到疑惑。
These deep questions of domestic Chinese politics require further deliberation.
They also return us to the core question as to whether the US ultimately accepts the legitimacy of the Chinese political system given the radically different values system on which it is constructed, and continued Chinese objections to the universalist claims of US and western values systems over all others.
But the baseline US response, still dis-believed by many in Beijing, is that the development of China's future political arrangements are a matter for the Chinese people themselves.
There is one final set of American perceptions I wish to address today concerning China's long-term aspirations.
And that relates to the simple question of what China will seek to do in the region and the world once it has realized its dream of national wealth and power.
Put simply, a widely-held American view is that China's declared policy of its "peaceful rise" is temporary, in order to convince Americans and others that there is nothing to worry about. Whereas the reality, according to this view, is that once Chinese power, economically and then militarily, begins to achieve parity or pass that of the United States, China will begin rapidly to push the United States out of Asia, expand its sphere of influence in the region, and in time begin challenging some of the fundamentals of the current rules-based order.
简而言之，在美国普遍存在的看法是，中国宣称的 “和平崛起 ”只是暂时的，用来说服美国及其他国家不必担心中国现在的发展。由此看法所演化出的认定现实将是：当中国实现经济和军事上的强大之后，会寻求与美国达到权力均衡甚至超越美国；那么，到了那时，中国会迅速把美国赶出亚洲，以扩大中国在亚太地区的影响力，继而撼动现行的基于规则的全球秩序的基础。
Proponents of this view argue that this strategy is consistent with millennia of Chinese strategic thinking, such as Sun Tze's "Art of War," that the best way to prevail is to become sufficiently powerful so that armed conflict is rendered redundant, and one's objectives can be achieved by peaceful means. It is also seen as consistent with Deng Xiaoping's long-standing dictum of "hide your strength and bide your time."
这一看法的支持者认为上述战略与中国数千年来的战略思想是一致的，正如 “孙子兵法 ”所云： “不战而屈人之兵，善之善也 ”（《孙子兵法 .谋攻篇》）。与此同时，上述战略与邓小平的经久不衰的名言 “韬光养晦 ”也有不谋而合之效果。
For these reasons, it is argued, China wishes to avoid the possibility of armed conflict with the US for the foreseeable future because China fears, legitimately, that it would lose. Similarly with Japan where the argument is also that premature conflict could also result in China losing, or at least not winning. In either case, such an outcome would be deeply domestically delegitimizing for the Chinese government and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
This long-term American view that China's operational strategy is simply to buy time until it can alter the overall "correlation of forces" against the US and its allies has a growing constituency. And its effect is to encourage a deeply "hawkish" view on China's future, and importantly on how to respond to China in the interim "before it is all too late." This view may in turn also be reflected in increasing concern from a number of regional states requesting a strengthening strategic partnership with the US to offset this longer-term Chinese contingency.
这个关于中国 “买时间 ”的战略运作，在美国长期存在且得到了越来越多的支持。其影响在于强化鹰派视角 ——要在 “一切为时已晚之前 ”应对中国崛起。这一点也反映在近期美国与亚太地区盟国关系的强化上，尤其反映在亚太国家为避免长期来看可能与中国发生的意外，而主动要求与美国强化盟国关系上。
Of course China has many responses to this particular American view. They are grounded in China's historical behavior of not extending its power beyond its borders. They point to China's long-term domestic pre-occupations. Also to the well-defined contours of its current policy settings which are set in deeply held views of the China's leadership on a multi-polar, rather than hegemonic world. Nonetheless dealing with this emerging American view of China's long-term intentions will be a critical factor in developing any common narrative for the relationship's future.
These remarks have primarily concentrated on China as seen through a range of American eyes.
I recently concluded my remarks at the CSIS in Washington DC on Chinese strategic perceptions of the US by saying that the fact that these Chinese perceptions exist does not by definition make them accurate.
What is important, however, is that these perceptions do exist, and to some extent they shape Chinese policy behavior.
Similarly with my address today here in Shanghai.
What I have sought to do is describe a range of US strategic perceptions concerning China's rise. Again that does not necessarily mean these perceptions are correct.
Nonetheless, they do exist, and they too contribute to the shaping of US policy.
And the more powerful China becomes, the sharper these differences in perceptions are likely to become.
So let me now conclude in identical terms to those I used to conclude my remarks in Washington.
In foreign policy, the beginning of wisdom is to understand what the other party thinks and believes and why.
And this is just as important for our Chinese friends as for the United States.
Nonetheless, I am not some sort of foreign policy utopian, believing there is a mystical center-point at which both these world-views will one day mysteriously coincide.
I am too much of a realist for that.
Although at the same time I am sufficient of a liberal internationalist not to allow hyper-realism to overwhelm the possibilities of evolving a common approach for both the US and China, at least on some common challenges.
As I have written for most of this year that I have been at the Belfer Center at Harvard, I believe what is useful for the two Presidents to develop a common narrative for the future that allows sufficient space for real differences to be acknowledged.
At present, each side has a narrative, usually private rather than public, about the other.
In stead I argue for a public narrative that contains an overall conceptual framework, a mechanism for managing differences, as well as a longer-term goal of substantive positive improvement in the areas of fundamental disagreement.
One possible framework might be called "constructive realism", or even "constructive realism for a common future".
可以称其为 “建设性的现实主义 ”,或者说以 “建设性的现实主义 ”构建一个中美共同的未来。
What do I mean by that?
First, the realist part.
Both the Chinese and the Americans come from a deeply realist approach to international relations.
And within that frame, there are defined areas where a lack of common values and or common interests will deny any ready resolution.
Areas such as the outstanding territorial disputes in East Asia.
These cannot be solved for the foreseeable future.They can only be acknowledged and managed so that conflict does not erupt, thereby destroying the relationship altogether.
Second, the constructive part.
Namely those areas of the relationship (bilateral, regional or multilateral) where China and the US, because of overlapping values and interests, can cooperate to build new "public goods" together.
无论双边,区域或多边关系,只要在中美有价值相通或利益重合的地方,就可以由中美共同构建区域及全球 “公共产品 ”。
In areas such as the bilateral investment treaty, new approaches to regional architecture in the Asia Pacific that help construct some basic confidence and security building measures over time in a region where there are none, climate change, cyber security, the Korean Peninsular and in time militant Islamism.
这些 “公共产品 ”可以包括 :双边投资协定、气候变化、网络安全、朝核问题、伊斯兰激进主义问题以及亚太共同体的构建以促进从来未有的区域互信和战略合作的形成。
Third, the future part.
Which if strategic trust is built incrementally over time by achieving success in part two above (ie the "Constructive" part) to deploy the political and diplomatic capital from these successes to tackling the thus far "too difficult to solve" issues in part one above (ie the "Realist" part).
It is important to have a long-term ambition for the relationship beyond an exercise in temporary utilitarianism.
Otherwise, we are simply postponing the inevitability of crisis, conflict or even war.
Of itself, such a long-term ambition can also become transformative.
Of course, such a concept of constructive realism, with or without a common future, would provide a framework for gradual progress, and ideally less regress, over time.
The good news is that these concepts may well translate reasonably into Chinese.
Realism is as sound a word in Chinese as it is in English. Constructive is an overwhelmingly positive phrase in Chinese.
And it is difficult, but not impossible, to reject the idea of a long-term common future in either language, albeit through a process of gradual transformation.
Finally Deng Xiaoping even has a phrase that while traditionally used to describe the arduous task of Chinese domestic economic reform, may well be more broadly applicable.
邓小平以中国国内改革为背景提出的一个概念 ,对于中国的进一步国际化和中美关系构建的未来 ,也极具参考意义。
Deng said that to cross the river, it is important to feel the stones step by step with your feet.
那就是： “摸着石头过河。 ”
So too might we be able to breach the widening gap between China and the United States over time.
It requires a realistic understanding of the values, perceptions and interests of the other.
It requires an equal amount of creative diplomatic imagination about what can be done constructively together.
It also requires the political will to dream of a different future other than that which history has shown us, often horrifically, from the past.
Perhaps this what Xi Jinping had in mind when he floated the idea of “A New Type of Great Power Relationship.”
或许这也是习近平提出 “新型大国关系 ”的初心本愿。
President Xi has talked much about the China Dream. American dream is also embedded within the American culture.
习主席常常谈论 “中国梦 ”。同样的 ,美国梦也是美国文化所不可缺少的核心价值。
Maybe it's time for us all to start dreaming more broadly of a common dream for all our futures.