

Integrative Diplomacy for the 21st Century

*Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen,
Shaun Riordan and Paul Sharp*[†]

Diplomacy is frequently regarded as experiencing an existential crisis, both in terms of processes for managing an increasingly complex policy environment and as a set of structures through which these processes operate. At the same time, diplomacy continues to perform an indispensable role in world politics. The uncertainties generated by this situation reflect a growing awareness that, whilst contemporary policy agendas continue to require a central, if changing, role for the state, many of the norms, rules and roles associated with diplomacy are no longer fit for purpose. Consequently, fundamental questions regarding the purposes of diplomacy, who is — or should be — involved in it, and what forms and practices it should assume to deal with new policy challenges,

[†] Brian Hocking, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Loughborough University; Senior Visiting Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'; Associate Editor of *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*.

Jan Melissen, Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'; Professor of Diplomacy at the University of Antwerp (Belgium); founding Co-Editor of *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* (HJD) and Series Editor of the Diplomatic Studies series with Martinus Nijhoff.

Shaun Riordan, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'; Head of Economics and Theory of Knowledge at International College Spain.

Paul Sharp, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'; Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota Duluth; Co-Editor of *American Diplomacy* (Brill) and *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, and Co-Series Editor for Palgrave's *Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations*.

need to be addressed.¹ In pursuing this theme, the article examines a set of interrelated issues underpinning the challenges confronting the practice of diplomacy within a framework that helps us to explore them in a coherent fashion. This framework we have termed “integrative diplomacy”.

INTEGRATIVE DIPLOMACY

In employing this term we are not suggesting that the key to understanding diplomacy is defined by regional integration projects such as the European Union (EU). To be sure, these are a central feature of the current diplomatic environment and present policy practitioners with a series of challenges and opportunities — as in the context of the European External Action Service. But the integration of national communities provides only part of the picture. More fundamentally, the rapidly changing landscape of world politics is marked by conflicting tensions which are global and national as well as regional in their scope. The resulting complex texture embraces disintegrative or fragmenting qualities alongside integrative pressures. Rather, the term is intended to capture some of the key characteristics of the diplomatic milieu confronting policy makers in an era of crowded agendas

Integrative diplomacy embraces a ‘post-globalist’ image that argues for the continued significance of state-related diplomatic systems and processes whilst recognizing the dramatic changes in the environments.

and increasingly dense patterns of communication. In order to clarify an often-clouded picture, the image of integrative diplomacy [see figure 1] seeks to provide a coherent view of how diplomacy is adapting to change.

Integrative diplomacy moves beyond two common and diametrically opposed perspectives; those associated with state centrist images and those associated with globalization in its various manifestations.² It embraces a “post-globalist” image that argues for the continued significance of state-related diplomatic systems and processes

whilst recognizing the dramatic changes in the environments — domestic and international — in which they have to operate. Rather than emphasizing the diminishing significance of the state due to a combination of internal and external forces — and zero-sum interpretations of the relationships between it and non-state actors, it suggests a more nuanced argument. This moves beyond the identification of a state versus a non-state actor dominated environment. Instead, it favors one that underscores the complexities of the relationships between them and seeks to differentiate the roles and functions performed by actors (including the diplomat as professional agent of the state). Consequently, we can identify a range of normative-analytic images of global governance in which diplomacy may play varying roles. Seemingly distinctive, disconnected — and competitive — diplomacies pursued by states, international organizations and non-state actors are integrated into the complex, multi-faceted patterns of world politics. The task is to integrate what have often been regarded as distinct categories.

The framework is based on four dimensions: contexts and locations; rules and norms; communication patterns and actors and roles (see table 1). Whilst it does not claim to offer an exhaustive picture of the state of 21st diplomacy it does seek to provide a perspective that highlights key features of its current condition. Central to the argument are the importance of policy and actor linkage, the demands imposed by “networked diplomacy” and radical changes in patterns of communication. In this sense, integrative diplomacy has a set of descriptive aims and a prescriptive objective in identifying key issues confronting diplomacy and the professional diplomat and possible responses.




Figure 1 Integrative diplomacy: a framework for analysis

CONTEXTS AND LOCATIONS

Diplomacy exists in a state of continuing adaptation. Partly this reflects significant changes in patterns and technologies of communication such as the electric telegraph in the nineteenth century.³ Some contemporary observers regarded the introduction of the cable as marking the end of diplomacy — or at least the institution of the ambassador — and so it has been with the advent of later technological innovations. From the electric telegraph to Web 2.0, the rise of social media and Wiki Leaks, how information is passed between the critical actors in international politics and ever-broadening constituencies has generated intense introspection about what professional diplomats do and how they do it. Alongside these technology-driven factors, pressures on diplomatic structures reflect fluctuating demands. To the current reassertion of

the need for diplomats to adopt an enhanced *commercial* role are joined the need to strengthen *consular* diplomacy in an era where crises impact on a globalised and increasingly mobile citizenry. Additionally, the practice of *public* diplomacy has assumed centre stage. Whilst for some these may be welcome developments, for others they are deviations from traditional diplomatic functions of political reporting and policy analysis.

Associated with these challenges confronting professional diplomacy exists a dual effectiveness and legitimacy problem. From the perspective of the general public and the growing range of actors claiming a voice in diplomatic arenas, the diplomatic processes and structures that have developed over the last four hundred years or so

are incapable of responding to the complex range of interlinked issues with which we are confronted. At a deeper, normative level, a skepticism regarding who diplomats are, what they do and, particularly, how they do it — a phenomenon as old as diplomacy itself — has become more salient.

This dichotomy between aspiration and performance, claim and counter claim, is represented in the wealth of metaphors and images that diplomacy has attracted. Advocating the utilization of social networking sites by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, former Foreign Secretary David Milliband has claimed that they have opened up the “secret garden” of diplomacy. Richard Haass has argued the case for “messiness” (that is to say a variety of forms) as a partial solution to the problems confronting multilateralism.⁴ A former Canadian diplomat, Daryl Copeland, promotes the virtues of “guerrilla” diplomacy⁵ whilst Carne Ross, a deeply disillusioned ex-British diplomat, argues dichotomy — and practices — the necessity of “independent” diplomacy as an alternative to the pursuit of national interest inherent in state-based diplomatic practice.⁶ In contrast, Parag Khanna has developed a case for what he terms “mega-diplomacy” as an essential means of managing a globalised world.⁷ Together with a wealth of other

Associated with these challenges confronting professional diplomacy exists a dual effectiveness and legitimacy problem.

metaphors, such terms symbolize at once the significance of diplomacy and the difficulties of analyzing its role in an era of rapid and fundamental change. These conflicting images of what diplomacy is — or should be — and where its problems lie, form part of the challenges confronting diplomats as they seek to adapt to changing environments.

Conflicting structures and competing goals

Since both the functions required of diplomacy and specific diplomatic machineries reflect the demands placed upon them in any given period, understanding the contours of both international and domestic policy milieus is a vital first step. Here the picture is one of both structural and systemic change. That is to say, shifts in power distribution and in key aspects of the operating principles underpinning the international system. The relatively simple (and often simplistic) analyses of the transforming international order in the post-Cold War era, such as a quantum shift from geopolitical to geoeconomic dynamics common in the 1990s, have been devalued by the recognition that the distinction was always suspect. Geopolitics continues to shape the international order, embracing huge shifts in the global economy, linked to equally significant shifts in technology — the triad of geopolitics, geoeconomics and geotechnology as Khanna portrays it.⁸

But the power configurations that this produces are uncertain and reflect the contemporary manifestations of two characteristic impulses of international relations: the realities of competition and the requirements of cooperation.⁹ First, there is little agreement on the shape of the diplomatic environment, as the rejection of a unipolar model has not produced a clear alternative paradigm — other than that which agrees that there is now a highly complex diffusion of power. Convenient labels — such as the popular but artificial Goldman Sachs inspired BRICs — or more recently, BRIICS (including Indonesia and South Africa) — fail to capture the elusive realities of the evolving distribution of power. Thus broad identifications of a multipolar order have led to differing interpretations of its form and consequences from neo/non-polarity to multiple regionalisms led by regional hegemons.

Second, however shifting patterns of inter-state rivalry are interpreted, they are intertwined with a cooperative imperative—underpinned by interdependence and the need for collective action in key areas such as environmental policy, food distribution, global pandemics, development, international crime and the challenge posed by fragile states. This has come to be identified in terms of a new international security agenda (NISA) associated with changes in society whereby international security is seen not simply in terms of the integrity and stability of the state, but rather in terms of the physical and economic security and welfare of the citizen within it.

The scope of these issues and the interrelationships that they have created are captured in the concept of *wicked issues* reflecting the linkages between, for example, fragile states, organized crime and terrorism that constitute a central challenge for 21st century diplomacy. Such issues are essentially unique in nature and consequently every diplomatic “solution” — or management strategy — has to be tailored to specific circumstances.¹⁰ Moreover, they are far less susceptible to rational policy processes of problem definition, analysis and solution — often because there is no clear and agreed definition of the problem — or, at least, significant dimensions of it.

Consequently, we are confronted by an international environment where traditional geopolitical agendas have re-emerged alongside NISA agendas. This is most obvious in the foreign policies of more determinedly “modern” states such as Russia and China, and also Iran.

In as far as European states, and the EU itself, need to engage with these (and other) states in pursuit of security or access to raw materials and energy, they too need to develop and implement geopolitical agendas. At the same time, the new international security agenda is conflicting with more traditional geopolitical agendas. The hegemony of Western values and interests will be increasingly challenged by alternatives emerging from Asia, Africa and elsewhere, and these challenges increase the demand for diplomacy as management of cultural diversity. At the same time, the demands for collaboration require professional diplomats to work with others and to redefine their own roles in the process.

Growing diversity: pre-modern, modern and post-modern diplomacies

Much discussion on diplomacy is factored around the concept of the new, as illustrated by Condoleezza Rice's "transformational diplomacy" and Hillary Clinton's outlining in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review of a *new* diplomacy based on the creation of a "global civilian service" embracing the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Aid.¹¹ However, as the foregoing discussion has indicated, the current diplomatic environment incorporates historical "layers" of adaptation to an evolving international order.

Consequently, features of pre-modern diplomacy — that is those associated with the pre-modern state era — are intermingled with those of the modern era. Furthermore, modern diplomacy is overlaid by a post-modern layer in which the dynamics of international politics are no longer dominated by concerns with balance, sovereignty and the separation of the foreign and the domestic, overseen by a highly centralized state with claims to total control.¹² Rather, post-modernity in world politics is driven by the logic of *mutual interference* in each other's domestic affairs, pursuing security through practicing transparency and developing interdependencies.

One of the key challenges that this clouded picture presents for those engaged in diplomacy at all levels is the need to recognize the diffuse nature of *diplomatic domains* — the often intricate web of issues underlying negotiations and *diplomatic sites* — or the character of the processes through which diplomatic communication occurs in specific arenas. Rather than one overarching model several patterns co-exist reflecting the varied nature of diplomacy, the increasingly complex patterns underpinning it and the actors involved. As Ansell and Weber have suggested, these range from diplomatic encounters marked by high levels of governmental input from national policy communities and/or intergovernmental organizations, through "shared" diplomatic arenas reflected in the multilayered and private categories to the "loose couplings" where government input is low and processes are furthest removed from traditional modalities of diplomacy.¹³

Whilst the boundaries between sites and domains are obviously fluid, the essential point is that different models for diplomacy coalesce around different policy agendas involving varying patterns of actors and arenas. This makes generalizations regarding what is needed, for example, in a national foreign service or foreign ministry difficult to sustain. Nevertheless it is clear that much more of the diplomatic effort involves working with others both within and outside the agencies of government. The shift towards “networked governance” conditions both the objectives and the strategies of diplomacy as those involved in it are required to develop holistic strategies, construct and manage diverse diplomatic spaces, persuade others to work towards the accomplishment of shared goals and to maximize knowledge capacity in producing relevant policy concepts, proposals and data which can generate consensus for action.

	State-centred diplomacy	Integrative diplomacy
Context and location	State as unchallenged terminal authority. Diplomacy located outside domestic arenas. Diplomatic sites primarily intergovernmental. Primary purposes of diplomacy negotiated outcomes.	Multiple spheres of authority and legitimacy in diplomacy. Diplomacy crosses domestic-international arenas. Multiple diplomatic sites and domains. Purposes of diplomacy more complex: agenda setting and managing issues through “thought leadership” and agenda setting.
Rules and norms	Clear normative expectations of behavior derived from sovereignty-related rules. Centrality of protocol. Immunity of diplomatic agents. Influenced by diplomatic legacy of secrecy/confidentiality.	Underdeveloped rules. Clash of sovereignty and non-sovereignty based rules. Openness, accountability and transparency. Institutional tensions in expanded patterns of diplomatic communication. Clashes of expectations between stakeholders.

<p>Communication patterns</p>	<p>Hierarchical information flows focused on governments. Relations with stakeholders defined in quasi-hierarchical terms as “outreach.”</p>	<p>Multidirectional flows of information underpinned by media and social networking. Open and inclusive networks but which can be fluid and unstable. Public diplomacy mainstreamed into diplomatic structures and processes.</p>
<p>Actors and roles</p>	<p>Diplomats whose credentials are based on principles of sovereignty. Non-state actors as consumers of diplomacy. Structures: focused on ministries of foreign affairs. Emphasis on guild-like qualities of the diplomatic profession; clearly defined roles with emphasis on the diplomat as gatekeeper between domestic and international policy environments.</p>	<p>Multiple participation based on varying models involving stakeholders whose credentials are based on interests and expertise rather than status. Non-state actors as producers of diplomacy. Structures more diffuse: more broadly constituted national diplomatic system. Diplomat as internal coordinator in expanded international policy environment and external boundary-spanner. Redefinition of roles as facilitators and entrepreneurs in complex policy environment.</p>

Table 1 State-centred and integrative diplomacy: a summary

RULES AND NORMS

The nature of diplomacy as an institution in a changing global environment will both reflect and be determined by the rules and norms of behaviour which underwrite and facilitate its operation. In one sense, the integrative diplomacy model accommodates the rules and norms enshrined in custom and law which have provided the framework for diplomatic structures and processes. At the same time, it challenges some key assumptions around which the state-based diplomatic system has evolved. The requirement for diplomats to interact with other stakeholders in diverse policy

environments demands that state and non-state actors need to be aware of the “rules of the game” informing both their own and others’ actions, and where these converge and diverge.

Sources and nature of diplomatic rules and norms

Rules and norms are derived from sources which locate the diplomat at the interface of two interlinked communities. The first comprises a transnational diplomatic community sharing a professional culture, language and recognized sets of working procedures and the second, a national diplomatic community whose norms and rules are traditionally embodied in the organizational cultures and values of the foreign ministry. The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Representation continue to provide the formal constitution of the world of diplomacy codifying a system based on the assumption that sovereign, territorial states are, if not the only actors in international relations, by far the most significant. These documents reflect the power, interests and claimed privileges of states.

Such a system, with its attendant rules, conventions and norms, simplifies, clarifies, privileges and secures the work of professional diplomats by, for example, identifying who is and who is not entitled to diplomatic representation, by demarcating the proper subject of diplomacy and providing diplomats with immunities and exemptions from the rules, conventions and norms which govern the conduct of others. In doing so, these conventions provide guidelines to two key issues: who are the legitimate participants in diplomatic processes and what are legitimate conduct, rights and obligations attaching to the status of diplomat? The answer to both questions is increasingly unclear. The consequent uncertainty that this will generate in the medium to longer term is one of the key issues to which diplomats and their organizations will have to respond.

Taken together, these rules and norms constitute a powerful legacy shaping the environment in which diplomacy is conducted. But they are being challenged from several directions. First of all, actors other than states now claim a seat at the diplomatic table and either work to their own rules and norms — which are

often in tension with those expressed in the working practices and assumptions of traditional state-based diplomacy — or seek to modify the latter in significant ways. Additionally, the distinctiveness of the professional diplomat — even the legitimacy of the diplomatic profession — is challenged by a refusal to recognize its claims to specialness within the structures of government and separateness from issues and processes seen as marking the realm of the foreign from that of the domestic.

Furthermore, contemporary international agendas and the interface of domestic and international policy demand the deployment of changed strategies — such as those broadly associated with public diplomacy — which may test the boundaries of conventional diplomatic practice. Added to this, there is the growth of divergent approaches rooted in distinctive domestic cultures and also geopolitical/geoeconomic interests which shape attitudes on significant sub-sets of rules adhered to by the West on issues such as intellectual property. At the extreme, it is possible that these divergent approaches will extend to the rules and norms of diplomacy itself.

Diplomatic rules and norms in a changing environment

The rules, conventions and norms of diplomacy have always been violated, sometimes systematically. Actors other than states or their organizations have often attempted to engage in activities akin to the traditional functions of professional diplomats — representation, negotiation, explanation, information gathering and dissemination. Furthermore, professional diplomats have been accustomed to interfere in the internal affairs of their host states. It is also true that people other than accredited diplomats have attempted to claim the privileges of authoritatively representing states and others in their relations with one another. And immunities have always been violated, ignored or suspended on occasions. However, commitment to these rules, conventions and norms has been strong enough in the past for them to be operative as standards by which to determine whether it was worth departing from them for reasons of policy, and how such a departure from them might be justified, judged or punished.

This is no longer the case. Actors other than states engaging in diplomacy and seeking diplomatic standing are regarded as normal, rather than as departures from the norm. The blurring of the lines between internal and external affairs has made involvement in the former a normal part of a diplomat's job. The same developments, together with leveling and democratic expectations about the ordering of societies have demolished the professional diplomats' exclusive claim to authoritative representation. And the immunities and privileges of diplomacy are no longer effectively defended even on functional grounds.

More importantly, new international rules, conventions and norms are in the process of emerging which reflect the multiple and linked actors, multiple and linked agendas, cheap and plentiful information, and the openness environment associated with processes of globalization. The "Responsibility to Protect" norm, for example, by attempting to make sovereignty conditional on the way it is exercised, poses a fundamental challenge to a basic organizing principle of the modern state system and on which the formal constitution of professional diplomacy rests.

New international rules, conventions and norms are in the process of emerging which reflect the multiple and linked actors and agendas, cheap and plentiful information, and the openness environment associated with processes of globalization.

How then is this gap between the emerging international rules, conventions and norms of integrative diplomacy, and the formal rules, conventions and norms of professional diplomacy to be managed? There are several options, the first of which is that of resistance to change. However, reasserting the rules, conventions and norms of a "golden age" of diplomacy is not an option. To insist on the leading role of foreign ministries, the centrality of resident embassies to a country's international presence, and the exclusive right of professional diplomats, working out of the public eye, to engage in representation cannot work. The second

option might be termed one of “muddling through”. Here, the formal constitution of rules, conventions and norms remains the primary reference point for conduct, but professional diplomats and their governments become skillful recognizing when it is to be applied and when it is to be ignored. Depending on where they are working and under what conditions, professional diplomats develop a sense of the kind of domestic interventions that they can engage in without triggering objections from a host government. The advantage of this approach is that it involves the skills associated with an art at which professional diplomats are by training and inclination good. The disadvantage lies in a future in which the daily life of the integrative diplomacy outlined above draws ever further away from the formal rules, conventions and norms regulating what is supposed to be going on. As the gap widens, skepticism and cynicism increase.

The third possible scenario is that of “hybridity”. This conveys the idea of thinking of the present, not as an incomplete transition from one condition to another, but as an ambiguous condition in its own right which exhibits sets of rules, conventions and norms from two or more ways of conducting relations. It is a condition to which diplomacy must be adjusted. It also suggests some possibilities for this adjustment. Might hybridity be reflected in separate rules, conventions and norms for the diplomacy associated with different modes of international relations and issues? “Vienna diplomats,” for example, might work on issues associated with the traditional conception of “high politics,” issues of war, peace, international status and national prestige, while “integrative diplomats” would not be bound by the same constraints and would work on the coalition-building required for promotion interests and cooperation on economic, environmental, and humanitarian issues.

A fourth possibility is that of transformation based on the growing recognition of the requirements for integrative diplomacy. The integrative diplomat creates, leads, and participates in policy coalitions that may shift from issue to issue. Effectiveness in this regard requires that the integrative diplomat is well positioned in policy networks where these exist, seeks to create them where they do not exist, and manages them effectively, often in conjunction

with a wide range of other actors and other types of actors. But what are the rules, conventions and norms which might be developed to govern and regulate this sort of diplomatic activity? Rules about the openness of communication and conventions regarding the simplicity and brevity of its content suggest themselves fairly easily. The same cannot be said in regard to the oldest diplomatic question: who gets to participate in integrative diplomacy and on what terms?

What is apparent is that the changing environment of diplomacy can easily result in mutual frustrations on the part of diplomats and non-state entities alike. Rules and norms fashion expectations. The behavioural expectations derived from sovereignty-related rules are not paralleled in the integrative diplomatic environment wherein patterns of behaviour characterized by some stakeholders clearly reflect different, non-sovereignty related norms. Thus for NGOs, access to and participation in diplomatic processes dominated by sovereignty-determined rules, come at a price and acceptance of confidentiality is part of that price. On the other hand, NGOs engaged in humanitarian diplomacy have become sensitive to the need to accept the need for confidential negotiations in the highly sensitive environments in which they work. Failure to do so can endanger the well being of populations whose interests they are seeking to promote as well as the safety of NGO officials themselves. If we are witnessing the emergence of a new phase in the evolution of diplomacy, an important aspect is the development of a dual process in which diplomats need to behave in what might be seen as “non-diplomatic” ways whilst civil society organizations have to accept that their success is likely to be as much determined by their diplomatic skills as their technical and knowledge-based capacities.¹⁴

A CHANGING COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT

Communication is the essence of diplomacy, determining its purpose and operational modes. Not surprisingly then, a central challenge to the practice of integrative diplomacy is the need to adapt to and exploit changing modes of communication and the

technologies that underpin them. Over the last two decades, rapid developments in the speed, direction, widening availability and sheer quantity of communication have begun to pose fundamental questions as to how diplomacy can and should be delivered to meet the needs of global, national and transnational interests. Alongside the enhanced linkages between issues, actors and policy arenas sits the growth of transnational and transgovernmental networks that

transcend established geographical and issue boundaries. These are accompanied by the compression of time and space and the impact that this has on the ways in which people view their place in local and global environments.

The integrative diplomacy model recognizes that a more complex communications environment is reshaping diplomacy and the forms and structures through which it is required to operate. This reshaping has four key aspects:

The integrative diplomacy model recognizes that a more complex communications environment is reshaping diplomacy and the forms and structures through which it is required to operate.

- (1) Range, forms and direction: the growing diversity of global agendas combines with the structural and systemic features of the international — and, increasingly, domestic environments — to make patterns of communication more diverse in terms of participation in diplomatic processes, less structured and hierarchical. Consequently, there is a growing emphasis on identifying stakeholders and creating and managing networks in which they can interact to achieve policy outcomes.
- (2) Objectives: increasingly the ability to set rules has become a core feature of world politics. As van Ham writes: “the vast majority of rules, standards, and regulations that cover international society’s *acquis communautaire* are set through non-hierarchical means of policymaking involving such postmodern processes as best practices, benchmarking, and naming-and-shaming”.¹⁵ Shaping agendas highlights

the importance of persuading other actors and agencies to adopt a government's preferred strategies by means of thought leadership. This is an increasingly important feature of diplomatic action which determines targets and methods of communication. One feature of this is the growing preoccupation with the nature and uses of soft power and the assets which can be deployed in utilizing it.

- (3) The nature of public and private domains: 21st century diplomacy is confronting challenges clustered around traditional demands for secrecy — or confidentiality — set against the requirements of working in more open policy environments. Achieving preferred outcomes involves influencing attitudes amongst foreign and domestic publics by means of often loosely defined public diplomacy strategies. Establishing the boundaries between openness and confidentiality (challenged by a more open information environment and the WikiLeaks experience) is a major issue for diplomatic actors at all levels.
- (4) The impact of technology: changing modes of communication have been major conditioning factors in the operation of diplomacy creating both constraints and opportunities. Symbolized by terms such as “virtual diplomacy” and “e-diplomacy,” the growth of rapid, real-time communication, the electronic media and social networking creates a vastly different communications environment from that of even a decade ago.¹⁶ Here, the two central issues are the need to understand better the implications of these developments and responding to them in ways that meet the expectations of policy practitioners and publics.

Diplomacy and policy networks

Two contextual features of integrative diplomacy help to determine the nature of diplomatic communication in the 21st century. First, the growth of rival centres of authority and legitimacy to the state and the associated need to develop links with a range of actors (stakeholders) outside government in developing and implementing international policy. Second, a

symbiotic internationalisation of domestic policy milieus and “de-foreignisation” of many policy arenas regarded hitherto as predominantly international. This provides integrative diplomacy with three major challenges. First, how to construct and manage policy networks. Who to engage with, how and for what purposes? Second, understanding the nature of soft power, how to identify and exploit soft power assets. Third, integrating public diplomacy strategies into the development and implementation of international policy.

In contrast to the traditional, hierarchical model of diplomacy that stresses the centrality of intergovernmental relations and modes of delivering diplomacy, integrative diplomacy rests on a more diffuse, network model. It is not that hierarchy is irrelevant since it is capable of providing direction and functional clarity. But increasingly successful policy processes require blends of hierarchical and network organizational forms. This is rooted in the recognition of the limitations imposed on both governments and non-governmental actors in achieving policy goals. Developing relationships through policy networks seeks to compensate for three forms of deficit confronting actors in achieving their policy objectives in diplomatic encounters.

The first of these is a legitimacy deficit reflecting a decreased level of trust in the institutions of government and a decline in public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy. This has a particular significance in the context of diplomacy which constitutes a mediating institution between people and policy arenas. The involvement of a broader cross-section of societal interests, as represented in civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly NGOs, which draw on different sources of legitimacy, provides one strategy for dealing with this alienation. Building domestic support through consultative structures and procedures is a common theme in foreign ministry statements.

The second deficit that underpins the growing interest in developing stakeholder relationships relates to knowledge. In the face of growing resource constraints, the knowledge capacity of government has diminished just as the demands imposed on it have grown. NGOs, firms together with think tanks and academia, have

a window of opportunity to fill this gap by capitalizing on their own expertise.

The third deficit, access, reflects the reverse side of the coin. Access to diplomatic processes and structures is still dominated by governments and the sovereignty-related rules and norms governing the international system. Despite enhanced access afforded NGOs in international organizations such as the UN and WTO, intergovernmentalism privileges states in the majority of international policy arenas. Governments also confront access needs in terms of leveraging linkages with transnational policy networks in which NGOs are influential players.

Overall, then, the diplomatic environment increasingly involves the trading of resources between different categories of actors. In one sense, of course, diplomacy has always been a “networking” activity. It is the composition and character of the networks that are changing as they acquire a much broader profile than in earlier eras. As a result, diplomacy demands the establishment of coalitions of diverse actors to manage complex policy agendas. The outcome is an environment in which diplomacy is no less important but where its character changes in important ways. The growth of the “enabling” or “catalytic” state produces forms of catalytic or enabling diplomacy.¹⁷ Here, governments pursue their goals less through their own resources but by aligning themselves with coalitions of other states, transnational institutions and private sector organizations. In some contexts — such as environmental diplomacy — the result is a symbiosis between state and non-state entities where diplomatic interactions can become a virtual seamless web of activity.

These patterns of diplomatic deficit and resource exchange underpin the growing concern with establishing policy networks which seek to change patterns of closed, club-like diplomatic environments into multi-stakeholder processes aimed at bringing together all major stakeholders in a new form of common decision-finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue.¹⁸ In such processes influence and the right to be heard are rooted not in the status accorded the diplomatic profession, but on the value of each stakeholder’s unique perspective and expertise. This modifies

the dominant diplomatic paradigm in significant ways. Not only does it challenge the rationale of the guild-like characteristics of traditional diplomacy, it offers a very different picture of who is involved in diplomatic processes and in what roles.

Working with diplomatic networks

If networks are of increasing importance in contemporary diplomacy, the first step is to understand their implications. There is no doubt about the importance assigned by diplomats to developing and operating in networks whether at the multilateral or national levels. Arguments advanced by foreign ministers and diplomats alike acknowledge that collaborative links inside as well as outside government are now an essential component of diplomacy as recognised by Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba in promoting the concept of what he terms “full cast” diplomacy.¹⁹

Terminologies differ but the essential point is that achieving policy goals in an increasingly challenging global (and domestic) environment demands collaborative efforts. International organizations — or at least some of them such as the UN and its agencies — have a longer history in developing such linkages and working within the structures intended to implement them. Experience at national level is more recent, variable and reflects a confrontation of organizational cultures and operational principles. Bearing this in mind, collaborative strategies pose several interlinked issues: what is a policy network? Who should one collaborate with? What are the objectives of such collaboration and, finally, how to identify the best means of achieving effective collaboration? These are testing questions but ones which diplomats should be conscious of, even if the answers are unclear. And they are central to the debates about the nature of public diplomacy and how to pursue it.

Defining policy networks — and stakeholders?

Governments are deficient in terms of the scope of their activities, responsibilities, speed of response to global issues, and range of contacts. Whilst multi-governmental institutions remain key ingredients in the management of global issues, the more

diverse membership and non-hierarchical qualities of public policy networks promote collaboration and learning and speed up the acquisition and processing of knowledge. Furthermore, decentralised networks face fewer transactional barriers than centralised decision making processes and are able to direct relevant information speedily to where it will have greatest effect.

The key differences lie in patterns of participation and communication. In policy networks, the focus is on the identification of policy objectives in specific areas and “stakeholders” who possess interests and expertise related to the issue area. This in turn involves viewing stakeholders less as targets or consumers of government-generated messages but as possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes. Hierarchical communication flows are replaced by multidirectional flows that are not directly aimed at policy elites although the ultimate goal will often be to influence elite attitudes and policy choices.

The challenge lies in identifying key nodes in policy arenas together with potential interlocutors located within them with a view to building relationships. Whilst an advantage of networks as patterns of communication lies in their openness and inclusiveness, they are likely to be highly unstable — in part because of the interpenetration of what in earlier eras could be regarded as reasonably differentiated domestic and international public arenas. Increasingly, diplomats need to manage both international and domestic environments to secure favourable negotiating outcomes. But the transnationalisation of patterns of communication reinforced by the rapid developments in communications technologies means that it is far harder to differentiate “publics” in international and domestic environments. The result is that messages directed to overseas constituencies “leak” back into the domestic environment and vice versa.

Public diplomacy: hierarchies and networks

One point at which the tension between traditional, government-centred diplomacy and networked diplomacy can be seen is in the public diplomacy agenda that now preoccupies diplomatic institutions at all levels.²⁰ Since the danger here is that in the race to embrace

The tension between traditional diplomacy and networked diplomacy can be seen in the public diplomacy agenda that now preoccupies diplomatic institutions at all levels.

another “new statecraft,” anything and everything becomes subsumed under this label there are three basic tasks in developing this facet of integrative diplomacy. The first is to disaggregate the components of public diplomacy and the ideas on which it rests. Second, we need to decide what public diplomacy is for and how it can be related to policy objectives. Third, it is essential to developing a strategy of influence through which these policy objectives can be achieved. In short,

the need is to integrate the “public” and the “diplomacy” components of “public diplomacy,” treating this as part of a holistic approach to developing and implementing international policy strategies.

Foreign ministries and other government departments are sometimes confused about what they are trying to achieve through public diplomacy programmes. These embrace two broad visions for public diplomacy, each rooted in differing aims and methods for achieving them. The first is rooted in the hierarchical cultures associated with diplomacy. Public diplomacy is viewed in terms of top down information flows, albeit adopting more sophisticated methodologies of “strategic” public diplomacy founded on theories of strategic political communication. Such an image implies a high level of awareness of the attributes of human behaviour determined by culture and patterns of media usage as well as a deep knowledge of overseas news organizations and political systems. In other words, it demands a holistic approach to building a “public diplomacy chain”. But this ultimately rests on state-centred models of public diplomacy in which people, groups and interests are regarded as targets of foreign policy. “Publics” are receptors of messages rather than partners engaged in dialogues with government and its agencies on policy agendas.

In the integrative diplomacy model public diplomacy becomes more than a component of the power inventory. Rather, it suggests a different way of framing international policy and the means by

which such policies can be implemented and therefore rests on a different understanding of the character of communication and negotiation processes. Consequently it demands that fundamental assumptions about how objectives can be achieved in a more complex international environment are critically examined. The point here is not that one image is right or wrong but that they serve different purposes which need to be clearly identified if appropriate strategies are to be effectively deployed. Shaping images of a state or international organization through cultural activities and information programmes can serve diplomatic goals. But diplomats need to be conscious of the scope of public diplomacy and develop a clear sense of what it can achieve, or how little, and where and why. Anholt helps here in differentiating four varieties of public diplomacy:²¹

- Promotion: generating and projecting information on international policy.
- Persuasion: influencing attitudes towards the source of such information.
- Image management through engaging with foreign publics.
- Policy shaping: facilitating the achievement of policy goals through engagement and collaboration on specific issues.

Whilst these varieties may have developed over time to serve particular needs, they now comprise a suite of objectives and strategies that governments will need to employ in different contexts for different purposes. The trick is to develop the ability to articulate and implement them. There is no “one size fits all” principle here: diplomats will increasingly need to mix and match elements from the public diplomacy inventory to suit specific needs.

The soft power problem

Strangely, public diplomacy discourses have frequently failed to embrace fully the traditional challenges posed by understanding power and influence. We can see this in terms of the ways in which discussions regarding a key principle on which public diplomacy — soft power — have developed. This has become hugely attractive to governments of all kinds. Consequently, anything and everything are seen as components of this vaguely identified and amorphous

Whilst soft power can support the exercise of military and hard economic powers, arrogant or unjust use of hard power can erode soft power.

concept as the leading architect of soft power, Joseph Nye, has recognized.²² Whilst soft power can support the exercise of military and hard economic powers, arrogant or unjust use of hard power can erode soft power. Any attempt to develop a soft power “index” runs into a range of methodological and other problems, as the Institute for Government’s global ranking of soft power acknowledges.²³ This requires policy makers to understand their potential soft power assets and how these are relevant to specific objectives — in other words, how potential resources can be converted into influence.

Evans and Steven make a move in this direction. In arguing the need for a “theory of influence” they make a case for differentiated public diplomacy strategies.²⁴ This requires a more systematic appreciation of what many governments have already found out: that public diplomacy is tailor-made — that is to say it assumes different forms and requirements in different contexts. Furthermore, public diplomacy strategies can have disruptive goals alongside those of engagement through dialogue and coalition building. Following this line of argument, Hudson in his overview of collaboration and partnership between government, business and civil society identifies four basic principles that diplomats can and should utilise in their thinking about engagement with others: clarity with any interlocutor about what, in principle, we can and cannot discuss and how any contribution might be developed; curiosity about other perspectives, ideas and possibilities; commitment to make a process of engagement work; courage to take the risk of reaching solutions, including taking personal responsibility for one’s part in building the relationship.²⁵ Such argumentation highlights the need for strategic thinking about public diplomacy and analysis of how soft power works and integrates “public diplomacy” into diplomacy. Consequently, it invites the question as to whether we should abandon the term recognizing that it is now part of the lifeblood of 21st-century diplomacy.

Integrating E-diplomacy

Alongside the nature and content of the message, the means of communicating has been central to diplomacy. Responding to new technologies — the telegraph, typewriter and telephone — has been as much a part of the shaping of the diplomatic milieu as have the shifts in policy agendas and global power equations. But over the last decade, the growth of digital communications, social media and mobile communications devices poses new challenges to diplomats in responding in terms of adapting practice as well as developing organizational capacity. A core problem lies in making sense of the communications revolution and its implications for diplomacy. Recently most attention has been paid to the (sometimes exaggerated) role of social media in the Arab Spring and the potential for this phenomenon (as with the “CNN effect” in an earlier era) to revolutionize the conduct of international policy.²⁶ Nevertheless, diplomats in foreign ministries and multilateral organizations seem to recognize that something significant is occurring here even if they are not quite sure of its dimensions or how they should handle it.

In terms of public diplomacy strategies the opportunities for reaching huge audiences more effectively seem obvious but the points regarding the linking of resources to policy goals applies here as do the arguments concerning the need to recognize the importance of using new modes of communication for one-way information distribution as distinct from a tool for engagement. However, it is the U.S. State Department which is leading the way in the use of new information and communication technologies. E-diplomacy now employs over 150 personnel located in 25 different “nodes” with in excess of 900 staff using it at overseas posts. It permeates all areas of the Department’s activities, including consular, disaster response and policy planning.²⁷

But in many foreign ministries — and in other government departments — adaptation is slow, uncertain — and the subject of controversy amongst diplomats. Recent reports from the Lowy Institute on e-diplomacy and Australia’s “international policy infrastructure” note that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has been slow to adapt to change in this area when

compared to the more innovative Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs).²⁸ For example, DFAT has resisted allowing its diplomats freedom to express government views online whilst the adoption of the principle of “assumed competence” in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office gives ambassadors latitude to express what are labeled as their own views in blogs — to date without disastrous consequences.

In sum, the impact of the 21st century communications revolution on diplomacy is still uncertain and requires further analysis. As with developments in earlier eras, responses are likely to be uneven and hesitant as the potential of new technologies are evaluated and existing practices adapted to new demands. What seems clear, however, is that e-diplomacy offers the potential of new ways of working at all levels of diplomatic activity and, at the national level, this requires that it be mainstreamed into the organizational structures of international policy-making. In other words, it entails much more than responding to the rise of social networking and mobile computing.

ACTORS AND ROLES: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

It has become a truism to suggest that the diplomatic environment is marked by a proliferation of actors. Integrative diplomacy goes beyond this observation in stressing the importance and complexity of the relationships between actors in the context of enhanced interdependencies. The actors within a given diplomatic milieu have a mutual interest in each other’s policy objectives and strategies, diplomatic resources and organizational capacities. This mutuality of interest reflects a fundamental feature of the contemporary diplomatic environment; namely that a key strategy for all actors — whether governmental or non-governmental — is to persuade other actors to devote more resources and/or political will to manage global problems. As analyses of diplomatic network dynamics suggest, utilizing collaborative strategies is not only about persuading others to adopt one’s own goals but also achieving goals by helping others to achieve theirs. This is as much an issue for multilateral institutions confronted by changed patterns of

diplomatic communication as it is for NGOs whose role as co-deliverers of government policy in aid and humanitarian spheres may clash with policy advocacy work. But as noted earlier, it presents particular challenges to national governments and, more specifically to the ministry of foreign affairs.

Appreciating the nature of these challenges requires us to adopt a broader construct than that of the MFA — namely that of the national diplomatic system (NDS). This term reflects, first, the fact that the 21st century policy environment does not match the “command and control” assumptions on which the conduct of Cold War foreign policy institutions was based. Second, that the enhanced complexity of governments’ international policy agendas has resulted in a growing involvement of agencies outside the MFA. Rather than assuming that one government department has a dominant role in managing foreign affairs, the concept of the national diplomatic system sees this as involving increasingly complex networks, recognizes the implications of issue linkages and the need to establish close working relations between a range of “domestic” government departments in specific policy areas such as the environment and global health.

Consequently, the delineation of the NDS and the relationship between its component elements needs to be re-examined. For example, the increasingly critical link between diplomacy and development poses questions of organizational form and the degree to which development and foreign policy need to be linked. Whilst most governments integrate their aid programs and their foreign ministries, in the U.S. and the United Kingdom (since the late 1990s), the trend has been to separate them. Thus the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is not fully integrated into the State Department, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is separate from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Reinforcing the link between diplomacy and development through

The twenty-first century policy environment does not match the “command and control” assumptions on which the conduct of Cold War foreign policy institutions was based.

the strengthening of what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has termed “civilian power” is a central theme of the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

The precise form of the NDS will depend on the character of a country in its global and regional setting, the demands placed upon it and the constraints and opportunities open to it for shaping its international environment. From a UK perspective, Evans and Steven portray this in terms of managing global risks through the promotion of resilience in institutions and processes at both the global and national level.²⁹ A global player such as the United States is characterized by a high “domestic department” NDS profile together with a pronounced military security component reflected in the prominence of the U.S. Department of Defence whose international policy resources are frequently regarded as greater than those of the State Department. Whilst generalizations are misleading, developing countries are likely to have a more narrowly constructed NDS in which domestic government agencies play a lesser role thereby limiting their participation in complex transgovernmental diplomacy — such as banking regulation.

Bureaucratic/political conflicts in international policy management are part of the profile of the contemporary NDS. Two broad trends are evident: fragmentation and concentration. Fragmentation indicates the diversification of the NDS as sectoral ministries found their responsibilities acquiring enhanced international dimensions. Concentration denotes the enhancement of the foreign policy capacity of central agencies, particularly prime ministerial and presidential offices. Whilst this is partly a reflection of the growing significance of heads of state and government in diplomacy, it is also recognition of the potential costs of lack of coordination in the management of international policy and the desire to minimize its costs by centralizing policy-making functions.

What Role for the MFA?

The changing shape of the NDS redefines the key issues regarding role of the MFA and whether this constitutes — in the words of a report from the “Toronto Group” of MFAs — a “tipping point” for them.³⁰ Rather than challenges to its role

and perhaps survival, the issue becomes one of the shifting character, composition and tasks of the NDS and how the MFA relates to them.³¹ The primary issues are the requirements for the effective management of international policy and what added value the MFA brings to this in such areas as its policy analysis capacity. The debate about the status of the contemporary MFA largely turns on the extent to which it is able to meet the needs of the broader NDS. On the one hand, there are good reasons supporting the role of a department possessing high levels of global awareness and diplomatic skills. Certainly, a combination of institutional memory and the capacity to offer policy analysis and advice on complex issues is invaluable.

It is the first two of these functions that are most commonly regarded as being challenged. As a communications system, the rapid dispersal of information through the electronic media together with the growth of social media is frequently viewed as rendering the diplomatic network redundant. Similarly, the emergence of rival sources of policy advice and expertise, both in other government departments and outside them, in the form of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for example, are seen as threatening the value of the MFA in an environment where specialist rather than generalist, diplomatic expertise is valued.

Against this background, two models for the 21st century MFA emerge. The first is a “core function” model. This sees the role of the MFA in terms of its traditional activities — running the diplomatic network, providing consular and commercial services and offering a geographical perspective on government policy utilizing the resources of the network and home-based desks.³² The second model is an “expanded function” model which not only assigns a much greater policy-focused role to the MFA but also sees it as assuming a key strategic policy synthesis and coordinating role in managing the global policy agenda.

Unsurprisingly there is little obvious support from within MFAs for retreating to the comfort zone of the core function model. As the Toronto Group report points out, the reality is that foreign ministry functions will be determined by elements of both models as each MFA seeks to establish its place in the more broadly

configured NDS and makes a case for the added value that it can bring to the management of international policy. However, the expanded function model demands organisational and operational innovation if the MFA is to function as a key component of the NDS. One dimension is enhancing its capacity for policy analysis at a global level — something that has been downgraded in favour of management processes shadowing the quest for reforms in government bureaucracies at large. Nor does technology, including ICT, provide an answer. Over the last decade the deployment of ICT has tended towards increasing micromanagement of overseas missions and reinforcement of hierarchical structures rather than enhanced operational effectiveness.

Organizational innovation will be essential — for example in dealing with the challenges posed by international crises in all their forms. Here, two strategies are evident in underpinning the need for enhanced “surge capacity” to deal with sudden demands: “swarming” and developing a “diplomatic reserve”. The first of these is based on the dispersal of capabilities throughout the MFA which can be pulled together when needed. It recognizes that actors can have multiple capabilities, and can be deployed to use differing capabilities according to circumstances. The concept of a diplomatic reserve is based on the idea of the military reserve — officers and men who remain on the army’s books after their service and can be called up in times of emergency. But a diplomatic reserve would comprise a network throughout the academic, business and media worlds of individuals with specific skills and capabilities (linguistic, geographical or functional) that could be called on as the international situation demands. Taken together, these strategies would promote rapid adaptation to changing international environment and the maintenance of the necessary knowledge and skills to help navigate and manage crisis situations.

ADAPTING THE DIPLOMATIC NETWORK

The Toronto Group report argues that “We look upon the mission network as the *raison d’être* of the foreign ministry: that is what makes us different from any other ministry.”

This, however, reflects a dilemma for the MFA which is only enhanced by the integrative diplomacy model. From an organizational dimension, “owning” the diplomatic network can be seen as its key distinctive asset around which a case can be made for the expanded functions model. But in an age of growing austerity, maintaining the network will become increasingly challenging. Moreover, the network has ceased to be the “property” of the MFA as it serves the needs of the broader NDS and its constituent parts. The trend for many embassies to be staffed by members of departments other than the MFA is now a familiar one but in some larger posts has reached the point where professional diplomats are in a minority. The diffusion of bureaucratic interests at missions abroad poses issues of responsibility, communication with central government and the conventions determining the “tasking” of posts and, ultimately, policy coordination. In this light, the MFA confronts the problem of increasing demands on the network in the face of (in most cases) diminishing or static resources and questions of control and ownership. Meanwhile, diplomatic posts have to respond to the logic of “flexible presence posts” servicing the interests of the whole of government.

*Re-framing the Diplomatic Network Debate —
and Managing with Less*

Responding to the requirements of an effective diplomatic network involves the juxtaposition of three factors which facilitate the framing of decisions on the size and shape of the network. The first of these is related to function: what purposes is the network intended to serve? The second factor focuses on access and participation: which policy nodes do countries need access to in performing these functions? What level of participation is required in each case? Finally, there is the question of what modes of presence best serve the needs of function, access and participation? Effective integrative diplomacy requires the alignment of the three factors and for each NDS to establish a “representational matrix” based on this framework. Increasingly, the form that diplomatic presence assumes is being re-evaluated as small, flexible and quickly

deployable posts are often better attuned to contemporary needs than the traditional embassy.

A major theme in the debate is the reduced importance of traditional diplomatic reporting as opposed to well-focused policy advice enabled by the creation of secure email systems. In some MFAs, this has brought diplomatic posts more directly into central policy formulation, compensating for the reduced geographic expertise that a more functionally oriented structure can create. Alongside this are the re-assertion of the significance of commercial diplomacy and the growing service role represented by the enhanced importance of consular work which has entered the mainstream of diplomatic life.³³

Against this background, diplomatic services around the world are being rationalized and this has involved more than simply closing posts. Since 1990, Sweden has closed 59 missions and opened approximately 40. Denmark announced the closure of five missions in 2010. But national needs differ. Thus the size of the Indian foreign service is regarded as inadequate for a rising economic power with 669 diplomats distributed between the ministry in New Delhi and 119 missions and 49 consulates around the world, and is being expanded. In the EU the creation of the European External Action Service under the Lisbon Treaty poses interesting questions regarding its impact on member state diplomatic services.³⁴ One feature of the emerging EU diplomatic landscape is a growing trend among member states to reduce the resources devoted to intra-EU diplomatic representation.

Doing more with less has encouraged experiments with a range of structural reforms. These include making economies of scale through greater use of such devices as the designation of areas of concentration and “core” embassies which are given high priority in the network and assigned special functions and assigning specific functions to key posts sometimes as a replacement for local presence through regional geographic hubs.

Roles, Skills and Training

A fundamental premise of integrative diplomacy is inclusiveness and partnership in policy processes, bringing together major

stakeholders in new forms of decision-finding (and possibly decision-making) on particular issues. This challenges the closed, guild-like characteristics of traditional diplomacy and associated definitions of the role of the professional diplomat. Rather than that of a gatekeeper, policing the boundaries between domestic and international policy environments, an alternative role image more suited to the contemporary environment is that of the “boundary-spanner”. This recognizes that boundaries between organizations and policy arenas remain significant but are fluid and continually reconstituting themselves, thereby becoming sites of intense activity which demand a special role for those capable of acting as linkage points. In such an environment, diplomats can assume significant roles as mediators or brokers, facilitators and entrepreneurs.³⁵ Doing so suggests the growing importance of the capacity to develop strategic visions of global agendas, understanding growing conflicts over norms and rules, and the ability to establish and manage complex networks. These functions take us beyond familiar arguments about the rival merits of specialists and generalists in contemporary diplomacy. Indeed, they highlight the significance of traditional diplomatic skills — not least that of language skills which have been downgraded in a number of MFAs.

But rewriting the script of diplomacy does not mean that all functions will be carried out by the same diplomats, or even by the same government organization: the inherent contradictions between the functions of “entrepreneurial diplomacy” on one side and “geopolitical diplomacy” on the other may require the creation of differentiated diplomatic structures within the NDS. This in turn will involve rethinking the training needs appropriate to integrative diplomacy beyond the more traditional agendas common to foreign service institutes and diplomatic academies. Amongst other things, this will involve articulating clearly the objectives and requirements of staff within the MFA and broader NDS and considering how training programmes can best further them. It also demands

A fundamental premise of integrative diplomacy is inclusiveness and partnership in policy processes.

collaborative training opening MFA programmes to staff from other government departments (as the Netherlands MFA has done) and to business and NGOs.

CONCLUSION

The precise contours of the integrative diplomacy landscape are hard to determine since they reflect an ongoing pattern of change and continuity. Indeed, the lack of precise contours may be a defining characteristic of integrative diplomacy. On the one hand, many familiar landmarks remain. States are still central actors on the world stage and essential contributors to global governance. But this disguises profound and far-reaching change — particularly to the sovereignty-based rules and practices that have provided the framework for diplomacy. Above all, the changes to diplomatic processes and systems captured in the integrative diplomacy image stress the importance of linkages between actors, arenas and agendas and the gradual erosion of modalities of diplomatic separateness. Not only will traditional distinctions between bilateral, multilateral and summit diplomacy fail to capture this growing complexity, more areas of international policy will demand the integration of a range of stakeholders into policy networks. At all levels of diplomatic activity these changes demand the acquisition of new skills — such as understanding the dynamics of network management — and the redeployment of familiar, sometimes forgotten, ones — for example, operating comfortably and effectively within and between settings for different types of diplomacy. As this occurs, traditional institutions — such as the MFA at the national level — are reinventing themselves. At the most general level, however, integrative diplomacy asserts the continued centrality of diplomacy in an era when the demands placed upon it have never been greater.

-
- 1 Riordan, S., 2003. *The New Diplomacy*, Cambridge, Polity Press; Cooper, A.F., B. Hocking and W. Maley (eds), 2008. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Kelley, J.R., 2010. "The new diplomacy: evolution of a revolution," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 21: 286-305; Kerr, P. and Wiseman, G. (eds), 2013. *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, New York, Oxford University Press; Pigman, G.A., 2010. *Contemporary Diplomacy, Representation and Communication in a Globalized World*, Cambridge, Polity Press; Sharp, P., 2009. *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Van Langenhove, L., 2010. "The transformation of multilateralism: mode 1.0 to mode 2.0," *Global Policy*, 1:3.
 - 2 Cooper, A.F., B. Hocking and W. Maley (eds), 2008. *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
 - 3 Nickles, D. P., 2003. *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy*, Cambridge, MASS., Harvard University Press.
 - 4 Haass, R., 2010. "The case for messy multilateralism," *Financial Times*, January 6.
 - 5 Copeland, D., 2009. *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations*, Boulder, COL: Rienner.
 - 6 Ross, C., 2007. *Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite*, London: Hurst.
 - 7 Khanna, P., *How to Run the World*, New York, Random House, 2011.
 - 8 Ibid.
 - 9 Herd, G. P., 2011, *The Global Puzzle: Order in an age of primacy, power shifts and interdependence*, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva Paper Research Series no 1.
 - 10 Edwards, C., 2008. "Winning on wicked issues," *The World Today*, February.
 - 11 Clinton, H. R., 2010. "Leading by Civilian Power," *Foreign Affairs* 89:6 November/December.
 - 12 Cooper, R., 2004. *The Breaking of Nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century*, London, Atlantic Books.
 - 13 Ansell, C. & S. Weber, 1999. "Organizing International Politics: Sovereignty and Open Systems," *International Political Science Review* 20:1.
 - 14 Smith, H., 2007. "Humanitarian diplomacy: theory and practice," in Minear, L. and Smith, H. (eds) *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft*, Tokyo, United Nations University Press.
 - 15 Van Ham, P., 2010. *Social Power in International Relations*, London, Routledge.
 - 16 Schmidt, E. and Cohen, J., 2013. *The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business*, London, John Murray.
 - 17 Hocking, B., 1999. "Catalytic diplomacy: Beyond 'newness' and 'decline'" in J. Melissen (ed.) *Innovation in diplomatic practice*, London: Macmillan; Hudson L., 2009. *The Enabling State: collaborating for success*, London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
 - 18 Hocking, B., 2006. "Multistakeholder diplomacy: forms, functions and frustrations" in J. Kurbalija and V. Katrandjiev, *Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities*, Malta and Geneva, DiploFoundation; Heine, J. 2008. "On the manner of practicing the new diplomacy," in Cooper, A.F., B. Hocking and W. Maley (eds) *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
 - 19 Gemba, K., 2012 "Japan's efforts in the global agenda — implementing 'full cast' diplomacy," Speech delivered at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 28 February.
 - 20 Leonard M. and V. Alakeson, 2000. *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society*, London, Foreign Policy Centre; Melissen, J. (ed), 2005. *The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international relations*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave; Welsh J. and D. Fearn (eds), 2008. *Engage-*

ment: *Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Graffy, C., 2009, "The Rise of Public Diplomacy 2.0," *Journal of International Security Affairs*, 17.

21 Anholt, S., 2007. *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

22 Nye, J. S., 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York NY.

23 McClory, J., 2011. *The New Persuaders II: a 2011 global ranking of soft power*, London, Institute for Government.

24 Evans A. and D. Steven, 2008. "Towards a theory of influence for twenty-first century foreign policy," in Welsh, J. and D. Fearn (eds), *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

25 Hudson L., 2009. *The Enabling State: collaborating for success*, London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

26 Seib, P., 2012. *Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

27 Hanson, F. 2012. *Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy*, Sydney, Lowy Institute.

28 Oliver A. and A. Shearer, 2011. "Diplomatic Disrepair: Rebuilding Australia's International Policy Infrastructure," Sydney, Lowy Institute.

29 Evans A. and D. Steven, 2008. "Towards a theory of influence for twenty-first century foreign policy" in Welsh, J. and D. Fearn (eds), *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

30 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011. *The Foreign Ministry at a Tipping Point*, A Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands October.

31 Rana, K., 2007. *Asian Diplomacy: The Foreign Ministries of China, India, Japan, Singapore and Thailand*, Malta and Geneva: DiploFoundation; Rana K. and Jovan Kurbalija (eds), 2007. *Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimizing Value*, Malta and Geneva: DiploFoundation; Markey D., 2009. "Developing India's Foreign Policy 'Software'," *Asia Policy*, July 8: 73-96.

32 Schake, K., 2012. "State of Disrepair" *Foreign Policy*, 11 April.

33 Okano-Heijmans, M. 2011. "Changes in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy," in Jan Melissen and Ana Mar Fernandez (eds), *Consular Affairs and Diplomacy*, Leiden and Boston: MartinusNijhoff Publishers.

34 Balfour, R. and K. Raik (eds.), 2013, *The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies*, Brussels, European Policy Centre, EPC Issue Paper No.73.

35 Hocking B. and David Spence (eds), 2005. *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats* (revised edn), Basingstoke: Palgrave.